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I am grateful to the FIU Law Review for the invitation to present at this symposium, and for its
editors’ work on this comment. I delivered a version of these remarks at the Federalist Society’s Florida
Chapters Conference on February 28, 2015. See 2015 Florida Chapters Conference, FEDERALIST
SOC’Y, www.fed-soc.org/events/detail/2015-florida-chapters-conference (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
1
Professor Blackman, in his presentation, laid out the many ways in which the Obama
administration has ignored the plain text of the Affordable Care Act. See Josh Blackman, Government
by Blog Post, 11 FIU L. Rev. 389 (2016).
2
Interview by David Frost with Richard Nixon, Former President, United States of America, in
Monarch Bay, Cal. (Mar.–Apr. 1977), http://landmarkcases.org/en/Page/722/Nixons_Views_on_Presi
dential_Power_ Excerpts_from_a_1977_Interview_with_David_Frost.

37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 68 Side A

The country is sharply divided over President Obama’s policies. But
whether you celebrate or lament these policies, one thing is certain: Mr.
Obama has been one of the most effective presidents in history at making
his agenda a reality. At the end of his eight years, he’ll have left almost
nothing on the table. On just about every domestic and foreign-policy front
he has moved the needle significantly to the left. Yet, despite this policy
success, the Obama administration’s legislative accomplishments are
relatively few. President Obama cannot boast the legislative record of
Franklin Roosevelt or Lyndon Johnson, who ushered in the New Deal and
Great Society programs through hard-fought battles in Congress. And even
with respect to President Obama’s one major legislative accomplishment—
the Affordable Care Act—the actual text of the law has, in practice, had
only a loose relationship with the implementation of healthcare policy since
its enactment.1
How can it be that President Obama has accomplished so much from a
policy perspective while accomplishing so little in Congress? The answer,
of course, is that he has done it all through various forms of executive
action—from outright decrees, to rulemaking, to non-enforcement of
existing laws, to litigation positions. The Obama administration has gone
further than any in history in making policy through through executive fiat.
President Nixon may have once famously said, “when the president does it,
that means that it is not illegal,”2 but it is President Obama who has actually
governed according to that creed.
Professors, pundits, and politicians have now spent several years
debating President Obama’s various uses (or misuses) of executive power—
important and interesting debates, as highlighted by this symposium. But in
addition to debating the legality of these actions, we must also ask another
critical question: How is it that we’ve gotten to this point? How is it that the
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3
Two scholars have recently published excellent, longer treatments of this topic. See Charles J.
Cooper, Confronting the Administrative State, 25 NAT’L AFF. 96 (2015); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).
4
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
5
Id.
6
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. IV, at 179 (H.W.C. Davis, ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., Oxford at the
Clarendon Press 1908) (c. 385 B.C.E.).
7
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
8
THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis added).
9
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
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American people and their governing institutions have largely come to
accept an executive that acts unilaterally? The answer, I think, is that
President Obama’s assertions of executive power are merely the coup de
grace on a long period of legislative atrophy.3
To appreciate just how far we’ve come, recall the founding
generation’s views on the separation of powers. James Madison, famously
noting in Federalist 51 that men are not angels, explained, “In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”4 Madison
continued, “a dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on
the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of
auxiliary precautions.”5 These auxiliary precautions are found in the
structural provisions of the Constitution—the vertical and horizontal
separation of powers. With respect to the latter, the founders hewed to the
theory first espoused by Aristotle, who said in his Politics that the
deliberative branch of government is “the supreme element.”6 Echoing this
in Federalist 51, Madison wrote, “In republican government, the legislative
authority necessarily predominates.”7 Accordingly, as Madison explained in
Federalist 48, “it is against the enterprising ambition of this department that
the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their
precautions.”8 Acting on this belief, the founders wrote a constitution in
which the first article (establishing Congress) is much more finely wrought
than, and is more than double the length of, the second article (establishing
the presidency). The founders viewed the legislative branch—with the
power to make policy—as first among equals, and thus much more
carefully cabined that branch through structural protections.
But who could possibly think of Congress as predominant today? Our
modern system is one of executive predominance—an “Imperial
Presidency” as Arthur Schlesinger famously put it9—with power slowly
accreted over time. From healthcare, to immigration, to drug policy, to the
environment, to fiscal policy, to energy—no one really asks what Congress
is doing. All that matters is what the federal agencies are doing. There are
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10
See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 3, at 99–100 (describing Woodrow Wilson’s policy arguments
in favor of unifying power in technocratic experts); Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199,
1223 n.6 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (same).
11
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001).
12
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
13
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
14
See Den, ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855)
(holding that “matters[] involving public rights” may be adjudicated by agencies).
15
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
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many explanations for this—sociological, historical, economic10—but from
a legal perspective, legislative atrophy flows from several doctrines that
radically depart from the founding vision.
First, the federal courts long ago gutted the non-delegation principle,
which holds that Congress cannot grant legislative power to the executive
branch. The abandonment of this precept means that it is acceptable for
Congress to empower federal agencies with vast amounts of regulatory
authority and very little guidance. For example, it is acceptable, the
Supreme Court has held, for Congress to authorize an agency to pass
regulations on a topic in a way that is, simply, “requisite to protect public
health.”11 With this leeway, Congress has over time delegated ever more
policymaking work to administrative agencies, with ever broader grants of
power. Why take on the politically difficult work of policymaking when it
can be sloughed off on others?
Second, under the Chevron doctrine, if there is a “legislative
delegation to an agency on a particular question,” then federal courts are to
defer to the “agency’s construction of the statute which it administers.”12
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently held that courts must defer to
agencies on the very question of whether Congress has, in fact, delegated
power.13 Thus, not only can agencies make policy with a relatively free
hand, they can determine whether Congress has given them that free hand.
Third, agencies adjudicate cases that arise under the statutes they
administer.14 In other words, an agency can make policy, enforce that
policy, and then adjudicate the claim of an affected party who might
challenge that enforcement action. Indeed, the Supreme Court has even held
that, in some cases, agencies can adjudicate claims that arise under the
organic law of states, rather than under federal statutes committed to the
agencies’ administration.15
In modern American government, then, most law is made, executed,
and adjudicated by administrative agencies. What might the founders have
thought of this situation? Well, in Federalist No. 47, Madison told us
precisely: “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. RRs, 135 S. Ct. 1225, (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
18
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
19
Id. at 1877–78.
20
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring).
21
Cooper, supra note 3, at 108.
17
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definition of tyranny.”16
Some justices currently on the Supreme Court have raised concerns
over just how far aspects of the administrative state have strayed from the
founding plan. Indeed, in a concurring opinion in a 2015 case, Justice
Thomas called for a wholesale reworking of the Court’s non-delegation
doctrine: “[T]he test we have applied to distinguish legislative from
executive power largely abdicates our duty to enforce that prohibition. . . . I
would return to the original understanding of the federal legislative power
and require that the Federal Government create generally applicable rules of
private conduct only through the constitutionally prescribed legislative
process.”17 In other words, Justice Thomas would require Congress to get
back into the game of policymaking.
As for deference to administrative agencies, cracks are starting to
show. In City of Arlington v. FCC, a 2013 case, Chief Justice Roberts—
joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito—took the position that, in allowing
agencies to determine for themselves whether Congress had conferred to
them interpretive authority over a particular issue, the Court’s
administrative deference has gone too far. The Chief Justice quoted
Madison’s caution against tyranny and bemoaned “the danger posed by the
growing power of the administrative state.”18 The Chief Justice lamented
that “as a practical matter [administrative agencies] exercise legislative
power, . . . executive power, . . . and judicial power . . . ,” and that “[t]he
accumulation of these powers in the same hands is not an occasional or
isolated exception to the constitutional plan; it is a central feature of modern
American government.”19 In another case, Michigan v. EPA, Justice
Thomas went even further. He criticized not just aspects of the Chevron
doctrine, but “raise[d] serious questions about the constitutionality” of “the
broader practice of deferring to agency interpretations of federal statutes.”20
Of course, “Justice Thomas’s views do not command a majority of the
Court—or anywhere close to a majority. And it is highly unlikely . . . that
the Court will ever be composed of five originalists like Thomas.”21 So the
administrative state will march on—unchecked by the federal courts, at
least.
And the vast administrative state grows vaster by the day. How much
policymaking is being done by agencies? Well, in 2013 and 2014, federal
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agencies promulgated 7,213 new regulations while Congress enacted only
296 new laws—twenty-four regulations for every law, and about ten new
regulations per day.22 In terms of cost, “[b]y the [Obama] administration’s
own estimates, the rules it issued in [fiscal year] 2012 alone imposed more
costs on the economy than all the rules issued during the entire first terms
of Presidents Bush and Clinton, combined.”23 As Chief Justice Roberts put
it in his City of Arlington dissent, “hundreds of federal agencies [are]
poking into every nook and cranny of daily life,” and “the citizen
confronting thousands of pages of regulations . . . can perhaps be excused
for thinking that it is the agency really doing the legislating.”24
These numbers highlight another problem with the system we’ve
created: the administrative state is so vast, and the civil service laws so
protective of the employees who staff it, that there are few, if any, checks
on much of the work of the modern executive branch.25 The one elected and
accountable official in the executive branch—the President—is often unable
to truly control the expansive powers that the legislative branch has ceded
to federal agencies. We are governed not by the tyranny of an elected
president, but by the unchecked discretion of an unelected class of
permanent government officials. The courtiers, and not the king, hold much
of the power in the modern federal government.
The inability of the President to control the executive branch is not just
a matter of scope—it, too, is a matter of legal doctrine that perverts the
founding scheme. Under Humphrey’s Executor, Congress may establish
“independent” agencies that do not answer directly to the President. As the
Court put it, “[t]he authority of Congress, in creating quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties

06/27/2016 12:34:37
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22
Competitive Enterprise Institute, Ten Thousand Commandments 2014, https://cei.org/studies/
ten-thousand-commandments-2014; Competitive Enterprise Institute, Ten Thousand Commandments
2015, https://cei.org/10kc2015.
23
SUSAN E. DUDLEY, REGULATORY STUD. CTR., GEO. WASH. UNIV., COSTS OF NEW
REGULATIONS ISSUED IN 2012 DWARF THOSE OF PREVIOUS YEARS, ACCORDING TO OMB REPORT 1
(Apr. 22, 2013), https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/files/downloads/20130422_OMB_Report.
pdf. The economic costs of all of this regulation are of great concern. Even more concerning are the
criminal penalties that attach to this continuing onslaught of federal regulation. “There are . . . hundreds
of thousands of federal regulations that can be criminally enforced. . . . In fact, most Americans are
criminals and don’t know it . . . .” Alex Kozinski & Misha Tseytlin, You’re (Probably) a Federal
Criminal, in IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE 44 (2009).
24
City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1879 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
25
See id. at 1878 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“‘[N]o President (or his executive office staff)
could, and presumably none would wish to, supervise so broad a swath of regulatory activity.’”)
(quoting Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2250 (2001)); Daniel
Foster, One-Party Taxmen, NAT’L REV. (July 1, 2013), at 18, www.nationalreview.com/nrd/articles/
350943/one-party-taxmen (“[W]e are in large part governed by a politically insulated fourth branch of
government . . . in war and peace, boom and recession, no matter who controls the Congress, the Courts,
or the White House.”).
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Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 US 602, 629 (1935).
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[T]he
executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single magistrate.”); THE FEDERALIST NO.
70 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“Energy in the executive is a leading character in
the definition of good government. . . . The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are . . .
unity . . . duration . . . an adequate provision for its support[, and] competent powers. . . . That unity is
conducive to energy will not be disputed. . . . This unity may be destroyed . . . by vesting the power . . .
ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part, to the control and co-operation of others, in the
capacity of counselors to him.”).
28 Andy Kessler, The Department of the Internet, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2014, 7:29 PM),
www.wsj.com/articles/andy-kessler-the-department-of-the-internet-1415665771.
29 Andrew Johnson, FCC Chair Refuses to Testify Before Congress Ahead of Net Neutrality
Vote, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 25, 2015, 10:19 AM), www.nationalreview.com/corner/414380/fcc-chair-refusestestify-congress-ahead-net-neutrality-vote-andrew-johnson.
27
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independently of executive control cannot well be doubted . . . .”26 Well,
perhaps to the progressive eye of 1935, but to the founding eye of 1789
some doubt may have crept in.27
Combining these doctrinal developments—abandonment of nondelegation, extreme deference to agency interpretations, and establishment
of independent agencies—the situation is a follows: Congress can delegate
policymaking of any kind to an executive agency, the agency can interpret
the scope of its own authority under that delegation without much
interference from the courts, and the President can be completely walled off
from that agency’s decisionmaking.
For a jarring example of what this means in practice, consider a few
facts from a major policy shift that occurred during President Obama’s
administration. First, in announcing his support for a policy of so-called net
neutrality among Internet providers, President Obama in October 2014 said,
“My appointee [at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)], Tom
Wheeler, knows my position. Now that he’s there, I can’t just call him up
and tell him exactly what to do.”28 Second, in advance of the FCC’s vote on
Internet regulation in March 2015, Chairman Wheeler refused to testify
before Congress.29 Third, the FCC, in fact, voted to regulate the Internet as
a public utility.
Think about how perverse this situation is, at least from the
perspective of the founders. Why in the world is an executive branch
agency making the economy-altering, profound policy decision of how the
Internet should be defined and governed? Aren’t major policy decisions like
this precisely the province of elected representatives in Congress? And even
if it were appropriate for the executive branch to make this decision, how
can it be that the President of the United States is reduced to lobbying his
own appointees regarding what moves to make? To whom are Chairman
Wheeler and his fellow commissioners accountable? Who elected them? To
whom do they answer if the electorate cannot reach them, the President
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cannot control them, and Congress cannot even get them to testify?
Reasonable people can differ on the substance of the FCC’s Internet
regulations, but it is hard to see how any American who believes in
representative democracy and the importance of separation of powers can
believe that it is healthy or constitutional for the FCC to be able make this
important policy decision without accountability to either Congress or the
President.
The issue here—the question of whether certain functions are properly
delegated by Congress to the executive branch—is not the same as the
question of whether the Obama administration is exceeding even
Congress’s capacious delegations of policymaking power. The question is
whether the actual delegations Congress has made to the executive in the
last century are a perversion of the founding principles and an abdication of
Congress’s duty to make policy. The question is whether our entire
administrative state is sufficiently protective of liberty and faithful to the
founder’s constitutional scheme. As Professor Hamburger recently put it,
the current administrative state “systematically steps outside the
Constitution’s structures, thereby creating an entire anti-constitutional
regime.”30
So, yes, as others have pointed out during this symposium, President
Obama has taken to acting without statutory authority or in direct
contravention of clear statutory language. In so doing, consistently and
without hesitation, President Obama has pushed executive power further
than any president in history. His answer to any question of executive
authority has been “yes we can.” But once we have gone as far as we have
in delegation and deference to the executive—once we have spent a century
acclimating ourselves legislative atrophy and a government that is largely
dominated by executive-branch policymaking—is it really such a far leap
for the executive to simply start acting without, or in direct contravention
of, statutory law?31 No other institution of government is acting to stop the
aggrandizement of power, the people are not revolting against it, and the
media refuses to police it. Montesquieu once said, “Political liberty . . . is
present only when power is not abused, but it has been eternally observed
that any man who has power is led to abuse it; he continues until he finds
limits. Who would think it! Even virtue has need of limits.”32 In modern
times, we might say that even “hope and change” have need of limits. But if
30

C M
Y K

06/27/2016 12:34:37

Hamburger, supra note 3, at 498.
As Justice Thomas put it in his opinion in Michigan v. EPA: “Although we hold today that
EPA exceeded even the extremely permissive limits on agency power set by our precedents, we should
be alarmed that it felt sufficiently emboldened by those precedents to make the bid for deference that it
did here.” Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring).
32
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. XI, 155 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller &
Harold S. Stone eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989).
31

37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 71 Side B

06/27/2016 12:34:37

08 - PANUCCIO_FINAL 6.13.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

FIU Law Review

424

6/13/16 9:01 AM

[Vol. 11:417

33

C M
Y K

06/27/2016 12:34:37

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
B.H. v. State of Florida, 645 So. 2d 987, 991–92 (Fla. 1994). This is not to say the Florida
Supreme Court is paragon of virtue when it comes to all aspects of the separation of powers, especially
in recent years. Two extreme examples from 2011 suffice to make the point. In one case, the Court
created Humphrey’s Executor on steroids, by holding that the governor cannot control administrative
rulemaking of agencies headed by officials who serve at his pleasure. See Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702
(Fla. 2011). In another case (one of many), the Florida Supreme Court has aggrandized the legislative
policymaking power to itself. See, e.g., Pino v. Bank of N.Y., 76 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 2011) (retaining
jurisdiction over a case settled by the parties because the issue “transcend[ed] the individual parties” and
was “one of great public importance and in need of resolution”).
35
See FLA. STAT. § 120.545 (2016).
34
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no one will set limits, we cannot expect a president to set them for himself.
As Madison warned us, presidents are men, not angels, and we must “oblige
[government] to control itself.”33
The question, then, is whether there are still limits we can place on the
executive branch. Is it even possible in our globalized and highly
technologized world to have a government that makes most decisions
through the quaint, slow, and often cumbersome institution of Congress? I
think the answer is yes. I think it is possible for the legislative branch to
retake control, to legislate more carefully, with tighter delegations, and to
more closely monitor and refine what agencies are doing. I think this is
possible because it is exactly what happens here in the home state of this
law review—Florida.
As a doctrinal matter, the Florida Supreme Court has been more
willing than the United States Supreme Court to invalidate delegations as
overly broad. The court has “expressly and repeatedly rejected whatever
federal doctrine can be said to exist regarding nondelegation” and held that
the “far-ranging administrative powers tolerated in the federal system are
contrary to the fundamental philosophy underlying American
government.”34 Thus, few, if any, statutes in Florida grant agencies the
broad discretion afforded federal agencies. Yet the government still
manages to function.
Doctrine, however, is just words on a page. The real check on
administrative power in Florida is that the legislature takes its role
seriously. It crafts very detailed legislation and it revisits that legislation
when it feels an agency has gone astray or a new regulatory issue has
arisen. Moreover, the Florida Legislature created the Administrative
Procedures Committee, which examines every agency rule for consistency
with statute.35 If the committee objects to a rule, and the agency fails to
respond, the rule is deemed withdrawn. If the agency chooses not to amend
and so notifies the committee, the full legislature is put on notice of the
disagreement so that it can take corrective action if desired.
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This is not the place for a full exposition of administrative law and
practice in Florida, but the example of the country’s third most populous
state demonstrates that legislative work can still be done by the legislature,
even in our modern and complex society. One might argue that the federal
government covers too much ground for this kind of close, frequent work
by the legislative branch. But that is not an argument for abandoning the
horizontal separation of powers. Instead, it is a point in favor of
reinvigorating the other major separation-of-powers principle that the
founders put in place: federalism. If Congress cannot actively engage in all
that is going on at the federal level, then too much policymaking is being
done at the federal level.36 More policymaking needs to be left to the states
if that is the only place where legislative predominance—that is,
representative democracy and its attendant liberty—can properly function.
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36
Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1252 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“I accept that this would inhibit the Government from acting with the speed and efficiency
Congress has sometimes found desirable.”).

